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Abstract
We study a two-period saving model where the agent’s future income might be
ambiguous. Our agent has a version of the smooth ambiguity decision criterion
(Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005)), where the agent’s perception about ambi-
guity is described by a second-order belief over first-order risks. We model increasing
ambiguity as a spreading-out of the second-order belief. We show that under a “Risk
Comonotonicity” condition, our agent saves more when ambiguity in future income
increases. We argue that the condition is indispensable for our result.
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1 Introduction and Summary
We study a saving problem of an ambiguity averse agent facing ambiguity in future income.
The agent has a version of the smooth ambiguity decision criterion axiomatized by Klibanoff,
Marinacci and Mukerji (2005). When the agent is ambiguity neutral, our problem reduces
to the classic one of Kimball (1990). Our main result is that under an appealing condition,
the agent has a stronger precautionary saving motive when the ambiguity in future income
increases. The condition roughly says that when “first-order beliefs” about future income
change, the expected utility and the expected marginal utility from future income move in the
opposite directions. Since utility is increasing and marginal utility is decreasing in income,
this condition holds intuitively in a variety of contexts. We also argue that the condition is in
fact indispensable, so our main result is tight in this sense.
Our contributions are twofold. First, we propose a notion of increasing ambiguity for
future income, elaborating on the idea in Snow (2010).1 It relates directly to the informa-
tiveness of signals in Blackwell’s information theory. The notion admits various equivalent
interpretations and could be useful in a variety of applications. Second, we demonstrate that
the notion is plausible at least in our saving context. When the future looks more ambiguous
in our notion, an ambiguity averse agent is shown to save more as expected.
Our model is similar to, but different from, Berger (2014) and Osaki and Schlesinger
(2014), where the agent has the recursive smooth ambiguity decision criterion (Klibanoff,
Marinacci and Mukerji (2009)). Notably, Berger (2014) reports an important result that an
ambiguity averse agent saves more in the case of ambiguity in future income than the case
of no ambiguity, under a condition similar to ours in spirit. The result however is silent if an
initially ambiguous future income gets more ambiguous, which our model can neatly handle.
We speculate that such intermediate cases, though important, are hard to characterize in the
recursive smooth ambiguity decision model.
2 Precautionary Saving under Income Ambiguity
An environment is a pair (S ,Y) of random variables jointly distributed on R2, where S is a
signal and Y an income level. It summarizes an agent’s perception about income ambiguity.
In Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005)’s terms, each conditional distribution Y |S = s,
1Snow (2010) proposes a notion of increasing ambiguity in a general abstract setup.
2
s ∈ R, is a first-order belief about future income, and the distribution of all first-order beliefs
{Y |S = s, s ∈ R} induced by S is his second-order belief. Consider the saving problem of
an agent who has a sure income e ∈ R+ today, an ambiguous income (S ,Y) tomorrow, and
faces a per unit saving cost q ∈ (0,∞). The agent solves
max
z
U(v (e − qz) ,E [φ (E [u (z + Y) |S ])]) (1)
where z ∈ R is an amount of saving, and v, u, φ are increasing and smooth real-valued func-
tions over R with v′′ < 0,2 u′′ ≤ 0, u′′′ ≥ 0, φ′′ ≤ 0, and φ′′′ ≥ 0.
max
z
v (e − qz) + βE [φ (E [u (z + Y) |S ])] (2)
In period 1, the utility from net income is measured by v. In period 2, the utility is
calculated first by finding the expected values of u conditional on various first-order beliefs,
and then these conditional expected values, after transformed by φ, are averaged with respect
to the second-order belief. The utility function conforms with the smooth ambiguity decision
criterion.3 When φ is strictly concave, the agent is strictly ambiguity averse. When φ is linear,
the agent is ambiguity neutral, and (2) reduces to Kimball (1990)’s classical problem.
In the special case of v = φ ◦ u, the objective function, φ ◦ u (·) + βE [φ (E [u (·) |S ])],
represents an additively time separable preference.4 If Y equals to a constant y, then
E
[
φ (E [u (z + Y) |S ])] = φ ◦ u (z + y) = v (z + y), so v measures non-random income in
each period. If S is a constant, then E
[
φ (E [u (z + Y) |S ])] = φ (E [u (z + Y)]), which is a
monotonic transformation of E [u (z + Y)]. In other words, the preference restricted to the
second-period risks is represented by the vNM function u.
Different from the recursive smooth ambiguity preference model (Klibanoff, Marinacci
and Mukerji (2009)), our model distinguishes the ambiguity neutral preference and the am-
biguity averse preference in the absence of ambiguity. For example, suppose that v = φ ◦ u.
2The strict concavity of v is assumed to guarantee the uniqueness of the solution. It simplifies the presenta-
tion but is not necessary for our result.
3See Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) for an axiomatization. However, except for the trivial case,
our preferences are not recursive in the sense of Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2009).
4One can extend this type of preference to the sum of an infinite series of discounted utilities, which admits
the standard dynamic programming techniques in principle.
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When ϕ is the identity function (ambiguity neutrality), our objective function becomes
u (e − qz) + βE [E [u (z + Y) |S ]]
=u (e − qz) + βE [u (z + Y)] .
On the other hand, when ϕ is strictly concave and S is not random, our objective function
becomes
ϕ(u (e − qz)) + βϕ(E [u (z + Y)]).
Fixing v, u and φ as well as e, β and q, we study how optimal saving changes with
environment. Throughout, we assume that probability distributions in consideration are well-
behaved so that we can apply differentiation under expectation operators. Differentiating (2)
with respect to z gives
Ψ (z; (S ,Y)) := −qv′ (e − qz) + βE [φ′ (E [u (z + Y) |S ]) · E [u′ (z + Y) |S ]] . (3)
Since −qv′ (e − qz) is decreasing in z, and φ′ (E [u (z + Y) |S ]) and E [(u′ (z + Y)) |S ] are non-
increasing in z, then Ψ (z; (S ,Y)) is decreasing in z. Hence, our problem is a well-defined
concave problem. Write z∗ (S ,Y) for the optimal saving under (S ,Y). Then z∗ (S ,Y) ≤
z∗ (S ′,Y ′) if Ψ (z∗(S ,Y); (S ′,Y ′)) ≥ 0.
3 Comparative Statics on Environment
3.1 Increasing Background Risks
For an illustrative purpose, we first compare the optimal amounts of saving under (S ,Y) and
(S ,Y ′), where signals are identically distributed. Suppose that Y ′|S is riskier than Y |S with
probability one, i.e., based on almost all the first-order beliefs, the agent perceives a greater
income risk under the latter environment.
When φ is linear, Kimball (1990) shows that an ambiguity neutral agent saves more
when income risk increases. In our general setup, an ambiguity averse agent also saves
more. Indeed, for each z, φ′ (E [u (z + Y) |S ]) ≤ φ′ (E [(u (z + Y ′)) |S ]) with probability one,
and E [(u′ (z + Y)) |S ] ≤ E [(u′ (z + Y ′)) |S ] with probability one. Hence, Ψ (z; (S ,Y)) ≤
Ψ (z; (S ,Y ′)) holds at each z, and a fortiori at z∗ (S ,Y).
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3.2 Risk and Ambiguity Trade-off
Assume that S , S ′ and Y are jointly distributed. We compare (S ,Y) and (S ′,Y), i.e., the in-
come distribution is the same, but the signals are different, generating different ambiguity.
Recall that when S is a constant, (2) reduces to v (e − qz) + βφ (E [u (z + Y)]). Thus, tomor-
row’s income is purely risky, not ambiguous at all. At the other extreme, when S ′ = Y with
probability one, (2) reduces to v (e − qz) + βE [φ (u (z + Y))]. So the final income tomorrow
is evaluated with a compound function φ ◦ u, i.e., it is purely ambiguous rather than risky.
Notice that signal S is completely uninformative for Y in the first extreme case, while
S ′ is perfectly informative in the second. This observation suggests the following criterion
to compare ambiguous environments. It is essentially equivalent to that proposed by Snow
(2010).
Definition 1. An environment (S ′,Y) is no less ambiguous than another environment
(S ,Y) if S ′ is at least as informative as S for Y, i.e., for each integrable function f ,
E
[
E
[
f (Y) |S ′] |S ] = E [ f (Y) |S ].
In other words, an environment is more ambiguous if the agent learns more from the
signal. Since the agent cannot choose an action contingent on the signal, an additional piece
of information is useless per se, and it will even hurt an ambiguity averse agent who cares
about first-order beliefs.5
This condition is the same as the informativeness in Blackwell’s information theory. In
the case of discrete random variables, it is equivalent to that for each y and s in the support,
Pr (Y = y|S = s) = ∑s′ Pr (Y = y|S ′ = s′) Pr (S ′ = s′|S = s). In general, it says that for each s
in the support, the conditional distribution Y |S = s is an average of conditional distributions
E[(Y |S ′)|S = s].6
We shall show that our agent saves more facing the same income risks but more ambigu-
ous environment, under a condition below. Let
W0
(
S ′; z
)
:= E
[
u (z + Y) |S ′] , (4)
W1
(
S ′; z
)
:= E
[
u′ (z + Y) |S ′] . (5)
5See Grant, Kajii and Polak (1998) for their general discussion on Blackwell’s theorem without contingent
action choice.
6Snow (2010) uses this version, essentially.
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Since u is increasing and u′ is non-increasing, intuitively, W0 and W1 move in the opposite
directions with S ′. If S ′ brings good news so that Y tends to be high, then W0 tends to be
high and W1 tends to be low. But this is not necessarily true because Y is random conditional
on S ′, and this is what we need to assume.
Definition 2. Risk Comonotonicity at z is satisfied if W0 and −W1 are comonotonic random
variables at z, i.e., for each pair of realizations s′1 and s
′
2 of S
′,(
W0
(
s′1; z
) −W0 (s′2; z)) · (W1 (s′1; z) −W1 (s′2; z)) ≤ 0
At each z, Risk Comonotonicity holds immediately if Y = S ′ with probability one, i.e.,
tomorrow’s income is purely ambiguous, or if u′ is constant, i.e., the agent is risk neutral.
It also holds if the distributions in {Y |S ′ = s′ : s′ ∈ R} are ordered by the first-order or
second-order stochastic dominance.7
Proposition 1. Suppose that (S ′,Y) is no less ambiguous than (S ,Y), and that Risk Comono-
tonicity holds at z∗ (S ,Y). Then z∗ (S ,Y) ≤ z∗ (S ′,Y).
Proof. Let z := z∗ (S ,Y). We shall show that Ψ (z; (S ′,Y)) ≥ 0. Write for simplic-
ity Wi (S ′) = Wi (S ′; z), i = 0, 1. Since (S ′,Y) is no less ambiguous than (S ,Y),
then E [E [u (z + Y) |S ′] |S ] = E [u (z + Y) |S ] and E [E [u′ (z + Y) |S ′] |S ] = E [u′ (z + Y) |S ].
Thus,
E
[
W0
(
S ′
) |S ] = E [u (z + Y) |S ] , (6)
E
[
W1
(
S ′
) |S ] = E [u′ (z + Y) |S ] . (7)
Since φ′ is non-increasing, by Risk Comonotonicity, for each pair of realizations s′1 and
s′2 of S
′, (
φ′
(
W0
(
s′1
)) − φ′ (W0 (s′2))) · (W1 (s′1) −W1 (s′2)) ≥ 0.
Since s′1 and s
′
2 are arbitrary, we can take the expectation of the above, conditional on S , first
letting s′1 = S
′ and then s′2 = S
′. Thus,
E
[
φ′
(
W0
(
S ′
)) ·W1 (S ′) |S ] ≥ E [φ′ (W0 (S ′)) |S ] · E [W1 (S ′) |S ] (8)
7Actually, the techniques to establish propositions 1 and 2 in Berger (2014) can be applied almost directly to
assure Risk Comonotonicity. So we refer the reader to them for more conditions that guarantee Risk Comono-
tonicity.
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with probability one.
Since φ′ is convex, then by Jensen’s inequality
E
[
φ′
(
W0
(
S ′
)) |S ] ≥ φ′ (E [W0 (S ′) |S ])
with probability one. Since W1 is a positive random variable, then
E
[
φ′
(
W0
(
S ′
)) |S ] · E [W1 (S ′) |S ] − φ′ (E [W0 (S ′) |S ]) · E [W1 (S ′) |S ] ≥ 0 (9)
with probability one.
Since z = z∗(S ,Y), in view of (6) and (7),
−qv′ (e − qz) + βE [φ′ (E [W0 (S ′) |S ]) · E [W1 (S ′) |S ]] = 0.
Hence,
1
β
Ψ
(
z;
(
S ′,Y
))
= −q
β
v′ (e − qz) + E [φ′ (E [u (z + Y) |S ′]) · E [u′ (z + Y) |S ′]]
= E
[
φ′
(
W0
(
S ′
)) ·W1 (S ′)] − E [φ′ (E [W0 (S ′) |S ]) · E [W1 (S ′) |S ]]
= E
[
E
[
φ′
(
W0
(
S ′
)) ·W1 (S ′) |S ] − φ′ (E [W0 (S ′) |S ]) · E [W1 (S ′) |S ]]
≥ E [E [φ′ (W0 (S ′)) |S ] · E [W1 (S ′) |S ] − φ′ (E [W0 (S ′) |S ]) · E [W1 (S ′) |S ]]
≥ 0
where the third equality holds because E [·] = E [E [·|S ]], the first inequality holds by (8),
and the last inequality by (9).
Remark 1. Risk Comonotonicity is used to establish (8): φ′ (W0 (S ′)) and W1 (S ′) are posi-
tively correlated conditional on S . So we could strengthen Proposition 1 by simply assuming
(8). But as discussed in the next section, Risk Comonotonicity is indispensable for a robust
comparative statics result.
Remark 2. A similar analysis can be done with the recursive decision criterion, where the
relevant first-order effect corresponding to (3) is:
−qv′ (e − qz) + βE
[
φ′ (E [u (z + Y) |S ]) · E [u′ (z + Y) |S ]]
φ′
{
φ−1
(
E
[
φ (E [E [u (z + Y) |S ]])])}
If S is constant, i.e., there is no ambiguity, then the denominator of the fraction cancels out.
This is the property Berger (2014) takes advantage of. If S is not constant, i.e., both (S ,Y)
and (S ′,Y) are ambiguous environments, the comparison of the first-order effects appears to
be complicated, and there does not seem to be an analogous result as Proposition 1.
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3.3 Tightness
We shall argue that if Risk Comonotonicity fails at some z, then the saving implication is
reserved in some problem.
Let q, u and v be as assumed. Suppose that u′′ < 0, and for ease of exposition that
u > 0 so that when constructing φ, we only need to define it for positive numbers. Moreover,
assume that lim
x→0
v′(x) = ∞ and lim
x→∞ v
′(x) = 0 so that an optimal consumption level in period
1 is positive.
Let (S ′,Y) be an environment where S ′ takes values from {s′0, ..., s′n}, s′i with probability
pi > 0, i = 0, ..., n, and
∑
pi = 1. Suppose that Risk Comonotonicity fails at z > 0. Let
w0 j := E[u(z + Y)|S ′ = s′j] and w1 j := E[u′(z + Y)|S ′ = s′j], j = 0, 1. Without loss of
generality, say wi1 < wi0 for i = 0, 1.
We shall construct φ, e and (S ,Y) such that (S ′,Y) is no less ambiguous than (S ,Y), but
z∗ (S ,Y) > z∗ (S ′,Y).
Let random variables S , S ′,Y be generated as follows. First, draw a number from
{s1, ..., sn}, s1 with probability p0 + p1, si with probability pi, i = 2, ..., n, and set S to be
the drawn number. If s1 is drawn, choose s′0 with probability
p0
p0+p1
, and s′1 with probability
p1
p0+p1
and set S ′ to be the chosen number. If si, i , 1, is drawn, set S ′ = s′i . Finally, choose Y
according to the conditional probability distribution given S ′. Clearly, the joint distribution
of S ′ and Y is the same as in the given environment (S ′,Y), and (S ′,Y) is no less ambiguous
than (S ,Y).
To construct φ, let η be a smooth, positive, decreasing, convex, and integrable function
such that
p0
p0 + p1
η(w00) +
p1
p0 + p1
η(w01) − η( p0p0 + p1 w00 +
p1
p0 + p1
w01)
<
p0 p1[η(w01) − η(w00)](w10 − w11)
(p0 + p1)(p0w10 + p1w11)
.
This is possible since the left hand side can be made arbitrarily small by making η flat,
keeping the right hand side unchanged. Let φ (t) :=
∫ t
0
η (s) ds, t > 0. Clearly, φ′ > 0,
φ′′ = η′ < 0 and φ′′′ = η′′ > 0, as required.
Finally, let e be such that
−qv′ (e − qz) + E [φ′ (E [u (z + Y) |S ]) · E [u′ (z + Y) |S ]] = 0,
so that z = z∗ (S ,Y).
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To show that z∗ (S ′,Y) < z, it suffices to check that (3) is negative at (S ′,Y). Notice that
E[u(z + Y)|S = s1] = p0p0+p1 w00 +
p1
p0+p1
w01, E[u′(z + Y)|S = s1] = p0p0+p1 w10 +
p1
p0+p1
w11, and that
the expectations conditional on S = si and on S ′ = s′i coincide for i = 2, ..., n. Therefore,
E
[
φ′
(
E
[
u (z + Y) |S ′]) · E [u′ (z + Y) |S ′]] − E [φ′ (E [u (z + Y) |S ]) · E [u′ (z + Y) |S ]]
=p0φ′(w00)w10 + p1φ′(w01)w11
− (p0 + p1)φ′( p0p0 + p1 w00 +
p1
p0 + p1
w01) · ( p0p0 + p1 w10 +
p1
p0 + p1
w11)
= − p0 p1
p0 + p1
[η(w01) − η(w00)] · (w10 − w11)
+ [
p0
p0 + p1
η(w00) +
p1
p0 + p1
η(w01) − η( p0p0 + p1 w00 +
p1
p0 + p1
w01)] · (p0w10 + p1w11)
<0,
where the last inequality holds by the construction of η. This proves that (3) is negative at
(S ′,Y).
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